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Abstract
Boxing has been featured in the Competitive Program of the Youth Olympic Games 
(YOG) since the event was inaugurated in Singapore in 2010. This paper examines 
whether boxing is a suitable sport to advance the professed goals of the YOG. It 
concludes that it is not, and that it should be removed from the YOG’s Competitive 
Program. One line of argument focuses on the questionable impact of boxing 
on the health of young athletes. In this regard, issues of autonomy, consent, and 
paternalism are discussed in relation to the health of these athletes. A second line 
of argument focuses on the central purpose of boxing and its relation to Olympism. 
The paper suggests that, in light of the sport’s moral failings, the discontinuation of 
boxing would better align the YOG with the values of Olympism.
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The Youth Olympic Games (YOG) were inaugurated in 
Singapore in 2010 and constitute not only the International 
Olympic Committee’s (IOC) latest enterprise but also the largest 
multisport international event for young athletes. Its Competitive 
Program was based on that of the Olympic Games, with the same 
number of sports, but with fewer disciplines and events. However, 
some new disciplines were introduced, such as the very popular 
basketball three-on-three tournament, and other innovations 
included contests for mixed-gender and mixed-nationality teams.
Boxing has been part of the Competitive Program of the Olympic 
Games since 1904, although women were only allowed to box in 
Olympic arenas over a century later, in 2012, with youth following 
soon after (International Olympic Committee [IOC], 2015).1 
Although the YOG are intended for athletes between 15 and 18 
years of age, each International Sport Federation determines a 
specific age bracket for its sport. In the case of boxing, the second 
YOG held in Nanjing in 2014 included 78 boxers (60 men and 
18 women) between 17 and 18 years of age competing in ten 
categories for men and three for women. Since the inaugural 
YOG in Singapore in 2010 did not include women’s boxing, the 
2014 YOG in Nanjing were the first open to both male and female 
boxers (IOC, 2013, p. 7).
In this paper we will argue that boxing is not a suitable sport to 
advance the professed goals of the YOG and that it should be 
removed from the event’s Competitive Program. One line of 
argument will focus on the questionable impact of boxing on 
the health of young athletes. Issues of autonomy, consent, and 
paternalism will be discussed in relation to the health of these 
athletes. A second line of argument will focus on the central 
purpose of boxing and its relation to Olympism. The main issue 
will be whether boxing coheres with the philosophical vision at the 
heart of both the Olympic Games and the YOG. To accomplish 
the goals of this paper, we will start by explaining the vision and 
goals of the YOG. We will also provide an account of the idea of 
“youth” and discuss the role that adults should have during this 
period of life. These two lines of argument will allow us to build 
the case against boxing at the YOG.
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1. At the 1912 Olympic Games 
in Stockholm, boxing was not 
contested because at that time 
Sweden banned its practice.
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The Youth Olympic Games2
The idea to establish a global multisport international event 
for young athletes seems to have gradually developed among 
Olympic officials in the last two decades. Former IOC president 
Jacques Rogge was the driving force behind the initiative. In this 
regard, he declared that “The Youth Olympic Games is a project 
I’ve had at the back of my mind since being elected IOC President 
in 2001” (as cited in Slater, 2009, p. 33). Rogge traced his interest 
in the creation of this kind of international sport opportunity 
for youth back to the early 1990s. Rogge eventually formalized 
his project to create the YOG, the IOC studied its feasibility, and 
on April 25, 2007, its Executive Board unanimously approved it 
during a meeting in Beijing. Two months later, on July 5, the IOC 
approved the creation of the YOG during its 119th Session held 
in Guatemala City and decided that the first edition would take 
place in 2010. Early in 2008, Singapore was elected as the host of 
the inaugural YOG.
Apparently, it took some time to conceptualize and garner support 
for the YOG. Gilbert Felli, a former IOC Executive Director of 
Olympic Games, provides insight into this process. Although “The 
IOC had been thinking about it for many years,” Felli said, “when 
we talked about a purely sporting event the response was pretty 
negative” (as cited in Slater, 2009, p. 35). It was only “when we 
talked about a different kind of event in which sport, culture and 
education were equal, an event based on Olympic values, people 
said, ‘Ah, maybe this is something we should explore’” (as cited in 
Slater, 2009, p. 35). Although modeled after the Olympic Games, 
in the course of exploring possibilities for the YOG it was decided 
to depart from this model in certain respects.3 Whilst the event’s 
competitive element was retained, keeping along with all of the 
sports in the Olympic Games’ Competitive Program, the YOG 
were to be infused with “culture and education at its core” (as cited 
in Slater, 2009, p. 35). Thus, the structure of the event created 
by the IOC for athletes between the ages of 15 and 18 sought to 
maintain a balance between “sport, education and culture” as well 
as to “work as a catalyst in these fields throughout the Olympic 
Movement and to encourage young people to play an active role 
in their communities” (IOC, 2010, p. 4).
So, although the motivation for the YOG retains a commitment to 
the value of athletic competition, it also provides a fresh emphasis 
on the values that have inspired and framed the Olympic Games 
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borrowed from Torres (2010). 
For another historical account 
of the event, see Houlihan, 
Hanstad, and Parent (2014). 
3. See Lucidarme and Parry 
(2013).
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since their inception in the late nineteenth century, a philosophical 
vision known as Olympism. Thus, as Rogge articulated before 
the inaugural YOG, “The main goal is not competition as such. 
The main goal is to give the youngsters an education based on 
Olympic values” (as cited in Wade, 2010, para. 7). In other words, 
the YOG have been envisioned as a sizeable and unique Olympic 
pedagogical effort. At the very core of the YOG is the attempt 
to familiarize young athletes with Olympism and its values “in a 
fun and festive spirit and to raise awareness of important issues 
such as the benefits of a healthy lifestyle, the fight against doping, 
global challenges and their role as sports ambassadors in their 
communities” (IOC, 2010, p. 5). In this regard, the IOC announced 
in a press release following its Executive Board’s approval of the 
YOG in 2007 that “Sports events would be carefully chosen to 
protect the health of the young athletes” (IOC, 2007). Likewise, 
one of the themes of the Culture and Education Program, which 
along the Competitive Program was created to accomplish the 
goals of the YOG, is “Well-Being and Healthy Lifestyle” (IOC, 
2013, p. 2).4
Given that the YOG is obviously designed for young athletes, it is 
important to characterize briefly what it means to be a “youth.” 
Given the complex cultural, legal, social, and economic factors 
that influence its definition, it is difficult to precisely establish 
the parameters of the term youth, and our task is not assisted 
by the fact that, in many jurisdictions, the distinctions between 
child/youth/adult are a) confused and b) cut across the YOG’s 
15-18 age range.5 Acknowledging that complexity and that there 
are different legal demarcations in different countries, the term 
youth typically refers to the relatively lengthy stage of life prior 
to adulthood. While these temporal boundaries are flexible, this 
stage of life roughly ranges from the age of twelve to the age of 
legal adulthood and it shares some of the attributes of childhood. 
Youths are closer to adulthood than younger children but they are 
children nonetheless and hence exhibit some of the attributes of 
childhood.
Following Tamar Schapiro’s (1999) Kantian approach to 
childhood, it could be contended that youth are not fully “in a 
position to speak in [their] own voice because there is no voice 
which counts as [theirs]” (p. 729).6 For Schapiro, childhood 
presents a normative predicament in which persons are in a state 
of underdevelopment. By this she means that “the undeveloped 
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4. The Culture and Education 
Program has been rebranded 
“Learn & Share,” but its mission 
remains the same. See IOC 
(2016a).
5. For example, in the United 
Kingdom, a 16-year-old can live 
alone, marry, join the army, and 
die for the country, factors which 
accord adult status. However, 
the (adult) courts do not deal 
with cases involving 16-18-year-
olds, which go to the “Youth 
Court.” Presumably, this means 
that 15-year-olds are dealt with 
as “children.”
6. This paragraph is borrowed 
from Torres and Hager (2013).
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agent, unlike the developed agent, is unable to work out a plan 
of life ‘all at once’” (Schapiro, 1999, p. 730). Schapiro is aware 
of the enormity of the normative predicament in which children 
find themselves and believes that such a condition excuses a 
paternalistic attitude towards children if their ability to work out 
a plan of life all at once is not yet developed. Thus, she proposes 
that adults have a duty to help children overcome this normative 
predicament, but realizes that it is only children themselves who can 
do so. In other words, children have to develop a voice that counts 
as legitimately theirs that will assist them in conceiving a broad life 
plan. Schapiro supports a principle stating that adults should, to 
the best of their ability, help children become developed agents. 
To do so, she contends that adults must recognize both negative 
and positive obligations to children. Adults have a negative 
obligation to abstain from impeding children’s quest to find their 
own voice and a positive obligation to support such children’s 
quest in every way possible, the ultimate goal being to facilitate the 
latter’s most exigent quest to develop as autonomous agents who 
can authoritatively rule over themselves. For Schapiro (1999), the 
negative and positive obligations adults have to children “all stem 
from the idea that in order not to abuse our privilege as adults, we 
must make children’s dependence our enemy” (p. 737). This view 
indicates that paternalism toward children is only temporarily 
justified. It also recognizes that children develop a capacity to rule 
authoritatively over themselves as they grow. Finally, it suggests 
that adults should allow this developing capacity to be exercised 
in matters that children are capable of facing and handling, 
especially those that affect them directly.
Youth Boxing, Health, and the Youth Olympic 
Games
One of the most common objections to boxing is that it exposes 
participants to potentially debilitating and devastating injuries, 
and even death. While facial, head, and neck injuries are the 
most frequent in boxing, “Brain injury is the most significant risk 
. . . and acute subdural hematoma is the most common cause of 
death in amateur and professional boxers” (American Academy of 
Pediatrics, Council on Sports Medicine and Fitness, & Canadian 
Paediatric Society, Healthy Active Living and Sports Medicine 
Committee [AAP and CPS], 2011, p. 618). According to the 
American Academy of Pediatrics and the Canadian Paediatric 
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Society, there were 659 boxing deaths between 1918 and 1997, all 
due to brain injury (AAP and CPS, 2011, p. 618).7 Moreover, for 
these medical associations, “There is evidence that amateur boxers 
are at risk of structural brain injuries, cognitive abnormalities, and 
neurologic deficits from the sport” (AAP and CPS, 2011, p. 618). In 
a recent discussion of what is known about the relationship between 
boxing and neurological injuries, Anthony Petraglia, Julian Bailes, 
and Arthur Day (2015) explain that “chronic neurological injuries 
from boxing tend to have an insidious onset and often present and 
progress once a boxer’s career is over” (p. 13).
Concussions, a form of traumatic brain injury, are of special concern 
in youth boxing because “there is evidence that a child’s brain is 
more vulnerable to injury and that recovery from concussion is 
prolonged when compared with adults” (AAP and CPS, 2011, p. 
619). From the 1984 Olympic Games in Los Angeles until the 2012 
Olympic Games in London, boxers were required to wear head 
guards to reduce the risk of concussions and other head injuries. 
That requirement was lifted for the 2016 Olympic Games in Rio de 
Janeiro, but only for male boxers, since their female counterparts 
still had to wear head guards. The rule change generated much 
controversy, partly because of differential rules across genders, but 
mainly because it remains unclear whether boxing without head 
guards is safer than boxing with them.8 As much as concussions 
are of special concern in youth boxing, “There is also evidence 
of diminished neurocognitive functioning on neuropsychological 
tests in amateur boxers without concussions” (AAP and CPS, 2011, 
p. 619). In short, there seems to be ample medical evidence that 
boxing (and not only professional boxing) poses significant risks 
to the health of participants. These risks seem to be even more 
significant in the case of youth boxing.
Due to their concerns over the risks that boxing poses to the 
health of participants, several medical associations oppose the 
sport and have called for its ban. For instance, the American, 
Australian, Canadian, British, and World Medical Associations 
recommend that boxing be banned. Likewise, the American 
Academy of Pediatrics as well as the Canadian Paediatric Society 
oppose boxing for children and adolescents (Purcell, LeBlanc, 
& Canadian Paediatric Society Healthy Active Living and Sports 
Medicine Committee, 2012).
The significant risks that boxing poses to the health of young 
athletes indicate that its inclusion in the YOG’s Competitive 
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number. For instance, an internet 
site lists 1,865 deaths between 
1890 and 201 (“Death in the 
Boxing Ring,” 2016). See also 
Svinth (2007).
8. There were many newspaper 
and magazines articles discussing 
this rule change. Two examples 
are Belson (2016) and Zhang 
(2016).
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Program contradicts the IOC’s announcement in 2007 that the 
event’s sports “would be carefully chosen to protect the health of 
the young athletes.” A sport that exposes participants to the risk 
of potentially debilitating and devastating facial, head, neck, and 
brain injuries, and even death, could hardly qualify as one that 
protects the health of young athletes. This contradiction seems 
enough to show that boxing is not a suitable sport to advance the 
professed goals of the YOG and that it should be removed from 
the event’s Competitive Program. However, before accepting this 
conclusion, plausible counterarguments should be considered.
One argument against removing boxing from the YOG’s 
Competitive Program is based on libertarian grounds. It would 
propose that youths close to the legal age of adulthood should 
be free to decide to engage in boxing even if they are likely to be 
harmed by their decisions. Furthermore, it would also propose that 
allowing these youths to decide to engage in boxing and respecting 
their decisions is compatible with fostering their “well-being,” one 
of the YOG’s goals. This argument contends that children should 
be allowed if not unlimited at least an ample degree of freedom 
and that adults should show maximal respect for their autonomy.
The radical libertarian and anti-paternalistic argument to allow 
youth boxing at the YOG though is open to serious objections. 
For instance, even John Stuart Mill (1865), the great defender of 
human freedom, accepted that the anti-paternalism articulated 
in his Harm Principle, which argues “That the only purpose for 
which power can be rightfully exercised over any member of a 
civilized community, against his will, is to prevent harm to others,” 
(p. 6) has limits. Such paternalistic limitations apply, for example, 
to children whose decisions lack autonomy and may require 
protection from adults. It could be argued that young boxers lack 
the adequate information to make autonomous decisions. Yet, 
radical liberals could retort that providing relevant information 
rather than removing boxing from the YOG’s Competitive 
Program is the most adequate response to promote and respect 
young boxers’ autonomy. The crucial question, however, is not 
whether young boxers lack the relevant information needed to 
make an autonomous decision, but whether they are in a position 
to comprehend the risks of boxing and ponder about a life with 
the kind of potentially irreversible injuries that boxers sustain. 
Child psychology strongly suggests that children lack the cognitive 
ability to function as adults. In other words, they do not possess 
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the cognitive abilities and thus are not in an advantageous position 
to carefully reflect on the impact that boxing may have on their 
future autonomy. As such, young boxers’ requests or actions are 
not autonomous.9
Nicholas Dixon (2001) maintains that “In such cases, respect 
for autonomy may actually require paternalistic intervention” 
(p. 325). His position is compatible with Schapiro’s view on 
childhood, which says that paternalism toward children is justified 
as they develop a capacity to authoritatively rule over themselves. 
Dixon further maintains that “protecting boxers from the effects 
of agreements to which they have not given sufficiently voluntary 
consent—justifies pre-emptive protection of boxers, in the form of 
banning such contracts in the first place” (p. 331). In the case of 
youth boxing, because of the boxers’ inability to fully deliberate 
on their current and future interests, participants are unable to 
provide meaningful voluntary consent. If boxing creates conditions 
that severely jeopardize the current and future autonomy of young 
participants, there is a very strong case to remove boxing from the 
YOG’s Competitive Program. It should be noted that similar forms 
of paternalism are accepted in society and are well established 
in legal system around the world, since it is the most obvious 
rationale, for example, for the prohibition on selling alcohol and 
tobacco to minors.
Another argument against removing boxing from the YOG’s 
Competitive Program is based on the value that dangerous athletic 
activities have for children. John Russell (2007) contends that 
dangerous athletic activities, including boxing, are valuable because 
they help children develop not only personal health, safety, and 
good decision-making, traits related to personal independence 
and responsibility, but also character virtues like courage, 
perseverance, and self-sufficiency, which are constitutive of well-
functioning, rational people. He also contends that dangerous 
athletic activities are uniquely valuable for children because they 
provide opportunities for what he terms “self-affirmation,” which 
refers to “pressing individual boundaries and thus defining new 
self-understandings and conceptions of the self” (p. 182). That is, 
dangerous athletic activities “challenge us to push the boundaries 
of who we are by extending in certain ways the physical, emotional, 
and intellectual limits of our finite, embodied selves” (p. 181). 
Since childhood “is a time of self-affirmation par excellence” 
and self-affirmation is profoundly present in dangerous athletic 
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list of works addressing how 
children and youth develop: 
Bjorklund (2012), Bjorklund 
and Hernández Blasi (2012), 
and Thornton (2002).
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activities, Russell claims that “The elimination of all physical risk 
or danger from children’s lives . . . would impoverish what it is to 
be a child . . . by preventing the creation and discovery of what sort 
of beings we are and what we are capable of along certain physical 
and related emotional and intellectual dimensions of our being” 
(p. 182). For him, children should be permitted “to participate in 
self-affirming risky physical activities” (p. 183).
Russell’s (2007) position is obviously at odd with the soft paternalism 
mentioned above, “which holds that we are entitled to interfere 
with incompetent individuals [and children in particular] for 
their own good, especially if their behavior poses an unnecessary 
danger to themselves” (p. 183). Soft paternalism requires that 
adults prohibit children’s participation in dangerous athletic 
activities until they are capable of making autonomous decisions 
to participate in such activities. Russell recognizes that there is a 
genuine moral dilemma between self-affirming dangerous athletic 
activities and soft paternalism. While acknowledging that there is 
no “straightforward resolution to this dilemma,” he thinks that “self-
affirming behavior ought often, if certainly not always, be respected” 
(p. 185). The main reason Russell provides for his position is 
that “there are goods that can only, or perhaps only reasonably, 
be achieved in childhood” and that precluding participation in 
dangerous athletic activities until “adult competence is established 
. . . denies access to important, time-limited opportunities for self-
affirmation” (p. 187). Attempting to balance the tension between 
soft paternalism and allowing children to engage in self-affirming 
dangerous athletic activities, Russell explains that “Children 
should only be permitted to engage in risky behavior that they 
have a reasonable prospect of succeeding at, and thus of avoiding 
serious injury” (p. 188).10
Meeting this balancing requirement in youth boxing seems 
extremely difficult if not impossible. What would be a sign of 
readiness to succeed in youth boxing in light of the “concern that 
repeated head injuries associated with [the sport may] lead to 
long-lasting neurocognitive effects” (AAP and CPS, 2011, p. 620)? 
Even if it could be established, readiness to avoid serious injury 
in a single bout or tournament does not necessarily seem to be a 
reliable indicator that a young boxer is similarly ready to avoid the 
risk of chronic traumatic brain injury that boxing over an extended 
period of time poses. It could also be questioned if children, 
whose development is very much in progress and are still learning 
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to master the skills of the sport, are ever fully ready to succeed at 
boxing and thus avoid serious injury, both during single bouts and 
in the long run. A related objection would propose that to have 
a reasonable prospect of succeeding at the sport, aspiring boxers 
have to start training years before they meet the age requirement 
to qualify for the YOG, when young boxers are developmentally 
even more vulnerable to the pernicious effects of debilitating long 
term injuries that jeopardize central human functionings. These 
objections are strong enough to render boxing an unacceptably 
dangerous athletic activity for children, which indicate that its 
inclusion at the YOG is equally unacceptable.
However, even if young boxers could successfully avoid serious 
injuries, it does not follow that boxing, and more precisely all self-
affirming dangerous athletic activities, is morally tenable. It may 
be that boxing is a self-affirming dangerous athletic activity whose 
central purpose is so objectionable as to make it unacceptable, 
especially for children and especially at the YOG. The next section 
briefly examines the moral status of boxing, and the one after 
articulates what boxing demands against what Olympism means. 
This will allow us to suggest that boxing is morally untenable and 
that it is incongruous with Olympism.
The Moral Status of Boxing
The American Academy of Pediatrics and the Canadian Paediatric 
Society define boxing as a “sport in which participants fight and 
win points for scoring clean blows to the head and body above 
the belt” (AAP and CPS, 2011, p. 611). As Colin Radford (1996) 
argues, a boxer can only win “by knocking his opponent out, or 
by out-pointing him, and he can only do that by punching his 
opponent more frequently, cleanly and effectively than he is 
punched himself. . . . A boxer, therefore, is hoping and trying to 
hurt his man” (p. 156) Robert L. Simon (1991) agrees with this 
description of boxing asserting that it “has the goal of infliction 
of harm by one opponent on another at its core, and so makes 
violence central” (p. 64). Similarly, Joyce Carol Oates (1987) 
argues that “boxing is the only sport in which the objective is to 
cause injury: the brain is the target, the knockout the goal” (p. 
93).
Notice that Radford says that the objective of boxing is to hurt, 
whereas Simon says it is to harm, and Oates says it is to injure. 
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These, however, are significantly different objectives. A boxing 
bout might be lost owing to an injury (say, a cut above the eye due 
to an accidental clash of heads), without much hurt and with no 
significant harm. The same injury might occasion a substitution in 
soccer or rugby. A boxing bout might be won on points without 
injury or harm. A boxer might seek to hurt his/her opponent, 
whilst wishing him/her no harm (just like a soccer or rugby 
player might). A boxer might win without seeking to cause injury, 
without targeting the brain, and without looking for a knockout. 
This is especially true of Olympic-style boxing, which does not fall 
to the kind of objections often marshalled against professional, or 
“gladiatorial,” boxing.
Nevertheless, it does seem that the ability to inflict injury and pain 
on opponents is an important component of success, since the 
rules of boxing permit (and to that extent also encourage) such 
violent interactions between opponents. A concomitant problem 
with the sport is the alleged attitude to selves that is inherent to 
it and that it promotes. Boxing requires that participants be, at 
least temporarily, numb to violence and the infliction of injury 
and pain on another self. As Dixon (2001) puts it, “In attempting 
to injure their opponents, boxers treat them as mere objects to 
be disposed of in order to achieve victory” (337). Selves are thus 
disrespected and diminished. Paul Davis (1993-1994) summarizes 
this objection forcefully claiming that “The boxing ring seems 
to legitimize an attitude towards another self that is otherwise 
regarded morally unacceptable, and the psychology that might 
get someone imprisoned seems to be a part of the toolkit that 
can gain the boxer the status of local, national, and international 
celebrity” (p. 56).
However, the same is true with some football skills, which are equally 
disallowed in the rest of life. For instance, shoulder charging is not 
allowed in the bus queue. Davis’s argument ignores the sporting 
context, which is clearly crucial. It transfers the understanding of 
morality within the sport to morality outside the sport.
Consider what routinely happens at the end of a fight. Immediately 
on the final bell there are cuddles and mutual respect. It is claimed 
that the attitude and response to selves, which outside of the ring 
would be unacceptable and mystifying, makes boxing morally 
unintelligible. However, this objection fails to recognize the 
many attempts there have been to describe the virtues of combat 
(and combat sports). Whatever war is, and however evil it might 
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be, it is surely intelligible, and some argue that it is the source of 
human virtues. So we still stand in need of a solid criterion for the 
unacceptability of boxing.11
Furthermore, if we consider the incidence of concussive contacts, 
or the effect of repeated concussive blows on participants, there are 
other sports than boxing that may be seen as morally problematic, 
including soccer, rugby and football. Similarly, if the attempt to hurt 
opponents were seen as illegitimate, then these same three sports 
would again be morally problematic, since hurting opponents is 
an important element in these sports, serving to diminish their 
stamina and their capacities at later stages of a game. The crucial 
difference between these sports and boxing is as follows. In soccer, 
rugby, and football, as well as other sports, hurting opponents is 
seen as legitimate only in the context of achieving some other 
legitimate aim in the game. In rugby, for example, the primary aim 
in tackling is not to hurt, but to tackle, and to achieve the aim of 
the tackle (to stop opponents, or to ground them, or to force them 
into touch, etc.). To be able to do so in a way that also brings them 
hurt (rattles their teeth, or takes their breath away) is an additional 
benefit. There is nothing wrong with that. It is unreasonable to 
participate in these sports with the expectation that one would not 
get hurt, either by accident or by the intentional action of another 
player.
Similarly, all these sports treat other humans “as mere objects to 
be disposed of.” Think of “driving” techniques in rugby, which are 
designed with precisely this effect in mind. Think of a linebacker 
shunting an opponent out of the way like a sack of garbage. 
Furthermore, as Cei Tuxill and Sheila Wigmore (1998) point out, 
the effect of such actions is one of reflexive self-objectification:
Clearly what is going on here is the objectification of 
opponents, seeing them merely as their “role”; but the 
player is also objectifying himself, not treating himself as a 
person, a being who is responsible for others and for the 
wider implications of his behaviour. (p. 112)
In any case, it is an unjustified assumption that, because boxers 
hit each other, they must be “objectifying” their opponents. 
To treat one’s opponent as an object would be to fail to notice 
their humanity. Objects do not hit back, opponents do. Boxers 
rather see themselves as overcoming another boxer’s capacities 
and abilities. To overcome another human requires some 
apprehension of his/her humanity, his/her strengths, weaknesses, 
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Russell (2005).
181
abilities, and capacities. In all these ways, boxers may think just 
the same as linebackers or rugby forwards. The crucial difference 
between soccer, rugby, and football and boxing lies not in the 
incidence of concussive contacts, or in the intention to hurt, or 
in the objectification of opponents. It rather lies in what the rules 
of boxing permit (which is not to say that it happens, or happens 
often). That is, it lies in the fact that the rules of boxing permit the 
player to adopt a reckless attitude as to harm the opponent, and 
even to intend to harm the opponent, without penalty. Contrast 
soccer, for example, in which recklessness as to harm an opponent 
not only draws a free kick, but also a caution (yellow card). The 
intention to harm attracts immediate exclusion from the game 
(red card).
The moral dubiety of boxing lies not in its requiring the infliction 
of injury and harm, nor in its requiring the moral viciousness of its 
participants (as if all boxers were psychopaths, bent on securing 
harm to and destruction of the opponent), but rather that the rules 
of boxing permit such attitudes to be expressed without penalty. 
Behind this lies a failure of recognition, a kind of denial, which 
fails to acknowledge the extent of possible harms to participants, 
and a consequence of which is a failure in the duty of care—a 
certain tolerance of, and a failure to protect adequately against, 
possible harms that might affect a future life of open possibility.
Boxing and Olympism
To determine whether boxing is congruent with Olympism or not, 
the latter has to be explored. One way to do so is to look at how 
the IOC articulates Olympism. The Olympic Charter (2016b), which 
“is the codification of the Fundamental Principles of Olympism,” 
(p. 9) explains that
Olympism is a philosophy of life, exalting and combining 
in a balanced whole the qualities of body, will and mind. 
Blending sport with culture and education, Olympism 
seeks to create a way of life based on the joy of effort, the 
educational value of good example, social responsibility and 
respect for universal fundamental ethical principles. (p. 11)
It also states that “The goal of Olympism is to place sport at the 
service of the harmonious development of humankind, with a view 
to promoting a peaceful society concerned with the preservation 
of human dignity” (p. 11). Moreover, it asserts that
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The practice of sport is a human right. Every individual 
must have the possibility of practising sport, without 
discrimination of any kind and in the Olympic spirit, which 
requires mutual understanding with a spirit of friendship, 
solidarity and fair play. (p. 11)12
Despite the vagueness and generality of these formulations, it 
is clear that Olympism’s ambition is to explicitly pursue moral 
values through the practice of sport.13 In other words, Olympism 
is an educational program that considers sport as a means to 
promote moral and social improvement. Different scholars have 
arrived at similar conclusions. For instance, while Jeffrey Segrave 
(1988) posits that “Olympism places sport in the service of an 
enlightened humanity,” (p. 159) Jim Parry (2006) considers it 
“a social philosophy that emphasizes the role of sport in global 
culture, international understanding, peaceful coexistence, and 
social and moral education” (p. 190).
Olympic advocates typically underscore the fact that one of 
Olympism’s most noticeable, and noticed, characteristics is the 
promotion of peace and international understanding. Since their 
beginning in 1896, the Olympic Games have been defended as 
a quadrennial multisport and multinational gathering meant to 
facilitate dialogue and empathy among the nations of the world. 
This feature of Olympism has been long enunciated as combining 
the expression of amor patriae along with the universal moral 
considerations demanded by the rest of Olympism’s features. It 
was Pierre de Coubertin, the founder of the IOC at the dusk of the 
nineteenth century, who first combined these elements in Olympic 
circles. As Sigmund Loland (1995) observes, “Coubertin’s special 
blend of patriotism, peace and international understanding 
merged into what he called ‘internationalism’” (p. 65). In 
Coubertin’s own words, internationalism must be “understood of 
course as respect for, not destruction of, native countries” (2000a, 
p. 537) and Olympism “as a destroyer of dividing walls” (2000b, 
p. 548). The Olympic Games are supposed to be the pinnacle of 
Olympism and the values it propounds. Historically, this has not 
always been the case. Nonetheless, as Loland (2014) contends, 
“The setup and structure of the YOG seems to a larger extent fair 
and closer to the Olympic ideals of mutual understanding and a 
sense of community than can be said of the [Olympic Games]” 
(p. 28).
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There are at least two areas in which boxing seems to be incongruous 
with Olympism. Both refer to our previous characterization of the 
crucial difference between boxing and other sports, which lies in 
what the rules of boxing uniquely permit - namely, they permit 
participants to adopt a reckless attitude as to harm opponents, 
and even to intend to harm opponents, without penalty.
Firstly, boxing hardly seems a promising sport to advocate “a 
peaceful society concerned with the preservation of human 
dignity,” as stated in the Olympic Charter. The harm that may 
legitimately be intended by boxers is in stark contrast with these 
goals. While peace is a complex concept, “scholarship has long 
emphasized the distinction between negative peace and positive peace” 
(Fiala, 2014, para. 1).14 The former is the absence of violence or 
war while the latter encompasses a tranquil order in which there 
is solidarity, mutual respect, caring concern towards oneself and 
others, and more broadly human flourishing.
Boxing’s character and potential for violence contradicts either 
conception of peace: it flatly denies negative peace as well as some 
of the values encompassed by positive peace. For instance, boxing 
is degrading because a) it permits participants to inflict injury 
and pain on opponents, b) it permits a temporary suspension of 
concern for persons (including oneself), and c) it permits without 
penalty “an attitude towards selves that is forbidden in other sports 
and that finds no moral sanction in the rest of life” (Davis, 1993-
1994, p. 61). We argue that human flourishing, the actualization 
of human capacities to the highest degree, is belittled when this 
kind of permissiveness takes place. This argument applies even 
more so to children, whose capacity to consent to the possibility 
of such assaults is questionable, and whose vulnerability to the 
possibly pernicious effects of such assaults is much higher.
Second, boxing hardly seems either a promising sport to advance 
international understanding. On the contrary, if anything, the 
attitude that boxers adopt toward one another is more likely 
to create animosity than amity. As Davis (1993-1994) affirms, 
“Boxing legitimizes a non-simulated viciousness towards another,” 
and “seems uniquely fitted, among sports, to the discharge of 
this attitude towards an opponent” (pp. 61 and 52). In reply, the 
following could be argued. During the bout, one is trying to win, of 
course, with all that entails for assaults and the effects of combat. 
But this does not transfer out of the ring. Indeed, the respect due 
to a fellow competitor in boxing is of the very highest order, since 
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every boxer knows what it takes just to dare to get in that ring. 
To the suggestion that it is difficult to display caring concern, 
friendship, and mutual understanding towards opponents when 
the activity that brings them together demands the infliction 
of hurt and a rancorous attitude, quite the reverse could be 
contended: the common challenge faced, and the very facing of 
it, brings boxers together. The mutually produced contest, based 
on the intention to overcome the other, is instantly forgotten at 
the final bell, where mutual congratulation and respect emerge.
Nonetheless, the central failing in boxing cannot be escaped: that, 
despite the values of honorable combat and courageous resilience, 
the activity does nothing to prevent or to discourage the intention 
to inflict injury and harm. Whilst the infliction of harm need not 
necessarily be a boxer’s motivation or intent, the rules fail to rule 
out such intent. This is what distinguishes boxing (as a combat 
sport) from other body-contact sports, such as varieties of football, 
which explicitly rule out violence (the intention to harm).
One wonders whether, because of this inescapable failing, boxing 
can be a sport conducive, paraphrasing Coubertin, to destroying 
the walls that divide the peoples of the world. The advancement 
of international understanding through the Olympic Games is 
a formidable challenge under the best of circumstances. We do 
not see why we should make such a goal even more challenging 
by endeavoring to accomplish it through a sport whose structure 
and rules are morally unacceptable. Other sports that do not pose 
this sort of moral challenge to the values of Olympism are to be 
preferred in the Olympic Games and obviously in the YOG. To do 
so would bring the YOG closer to those values.
Conclusion
In this paper we have argued that boxing is not a suitable sport to 
advance the professed goals of the YOG. Its central moral failing 
is to decline to outlaw the seeking of harm, injury, or pain to an 
opponent, as a means of securing victory. This is not to suggest 
that all boxers have rancorous attitudes towards their opponents, 
or are seeking to injure or harm them, but it is to point out that 
boxing as a sport permits (which might also mean “encourages”) 
those attitudes. The case against boxing as an appropriate sport 
for children and youth is that, whereas all other Olympic sports 
take adequate steps to minimize harm, especially in relation to 
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concussive blows to the head,15 boxing does not (and, indeed, 
cannot, since the head is a possible target).
Any subsequent risk to the health and well-being of young boxers 
justifies paternalistic protection, which is all the more urgent 
because children lack the capacity to make autonomous decisions 
regarding participation in such a potentially dangerous, even if 
self-affirming, activity. Whatever values boxing may offer children, 
the risk afforded by its permissive rules, and the potentially 
irreversible harm that might result, overwhelmingly indicate 
the inadvisability of allowing them to box. The rules are morally 
dubious and seem to be in contradiction with some of the tenets 
of Olympism, such as the fostering of human dignity, peace, 
and international understanding. Rather than advancing an 
enlightened humanity, boxing seems to undermine it. Boxing is 
an objectionable component of the YOG’s Competitive Program 
and should be discontinued, thus better aligning the YOG with 
Olympism.
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